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1. Introduction 
In the last decades logistics changed fundamentally: from a microeconomic point of view, 
logistics developed from an auxiliary function in materials management to an independent 
factor of production that would go onto coordinate world-wide supply chains. From a 
macroeconomic point of view, the rise of the logistics sector as an important employment 
sector is fundamental and a force for deepening the division of labor. This paper explores the 
driving factors of the rise of logistics. It demonstrates how traffic policy of a gradually unified 
Europe shaped the development of logistics from its basic functions of transport, handling of 
cargo, and storage to the modern concepts of high performance logistics, including concepts of 
organization of world wide supply chains and dimensions of quality in services, such as 
promptness and accuracy. Besides the political factor of the unification of Europe, one can 
identify an economic factor concerning the development of a consumer-oriented economy. The 
great variety of consumer goods was a challenge for the automobile production and the 
distribution logistics. As a third factor, the innovations in the parcel industry are considered 
where for the first time the flow of goods are linked to information technology to ensure speed 
and quality resulting in the “tracking and tracing technology”. The forth factor was the process 
of globalization, which led to the creation of production sites for consumer goods outside of 
Europe. As a result, the logistics of consumer goods distribution were realigned to import 
harbors, where consumer goods arrived pooled in shipping containers. The paper is based on 
the evaluation of research reports, monographs on traffic policy and national and European 
statistics. The rise of logistics has not drawn much attention of the scholars in the past. So this 
paper opens a new field of research. First we address to the consumer-oriented economy.  
The decades of the economic miracle in Western Europe after 1950, also called “trente 
glorieuses” or “miracolo economico”, mark an evolution of the consumer-oriented economy in 
Europe, which not only addresses mass consumption but also the mass production and mass 
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distribution of consumer goods (Strasser 1998). Mass production, mass distribution and mass 
consumption constitute a system. The automobile industry and the automobile trade, which 
form the basis of mass mobilization, play an important role within the consumer goods 
industry. The automobile cannot be viewed as only an important consumer good, but also as a 
product which enabled purchases in distant central markets and the comfortable transport of 
large amounts of consumer goods. It created the precondition for the focus on large scale 
entities in the retail trade. Other strong sectors of the consumption-based economic system are 
banking services, insurance services and services of the tourist industry. However, those 
sectors are less important for the supply of goods and are therefore neglected in this research.  
2. Mass motorization and the motorway network 
In the decades following 1950, mass motorization strongly contributed to the economic miracle 
in Western Europe.1 Automobile stock rose rapidly. In Western Germany, the growth rates of 
the 1950s amounted to 20 % per annum. Mass motorization got a fresh impulse from the 
reasonably priced, iconographic starter models: in Italy the Fiat 500, in France the Citroen 2CV, 
and in Western Germany the VW Beetle. The existing road system, which in many European 
countries did not include motorways, was unable to sustain the increasing motorization. There 
was said to be chaos and accidents on the roads.2 (Girnth, 1954). In response to the insufficient 
road network and the increasing influence of the auto lobby on traffic policy, European 
countries gradually extended the motorway network, which unburdened the roads and cross-
town links and promised fast and comparably safe driving (Mom 2005, Ross 1998, p. 86). The 
following table shows extension of the motorway network in the EU15 countries.  
 
Country/Year 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998 
Belgium 183 488 1.203 1.631 1.682 
Denmark – 84 516 601 861 
Germany 2.671 6.061 9.225 10.809 11.427 
Spain – 387 2.008 4.693 8.269 
France 174 1.533 5.264 6.824 9.303 
Ireland – – – 26 103 
Italy 1.065 3.913 5.900 6.193 6.453 
Luxemburg – 7 44 78 115 
Netherland 358 1.209 1.780 2.092 2.360 
Austria – 478 938 1.445 1.613 
Portugal – 66 132 316 1.252 
Finland – 108 204 225 473 
Sweden – 403 850 939 1.339 
United Kingdom 202 1.183 2.683 3.180 3.421 
Source: Eurostat (2002a, p.1). Data for 1960 from World Road Congress (1969, p.51).  
Table 1. Length of the motorway network in the EU15 in kilometers 
                                                                 
1 For Sweden see Lundin (2004, p. 303-337). For Italy see Paolini (2005). For Germany see Klenke (1993). For France see 
Loubet (2001). For Great Britain see Thoms et al. (1998). 
2 We define motorways in this paper as junction-free roads with two lanes for each direction. 
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3. The logistical function of motorways in the consumer-oriented 
economy 
The extension of the motorway network has not only served the automobile, but also the 
rapidity and economy of truck traffic. It gave a decisive impulse to the truck-based logistic 
systems. In the political debate about expansion of the highway system, two aspects - the 
transportation of people and the traffic of goods on the motorways - were viewed 
differently within European transport policy. In fact, German politics assigned goods 
transport to the railroad, and thereby pursued a twofold traffic policy: The motorway was 
mainly built for the automobile. However, this twofold traffic policy was short-sighted, as it 
did not address the economic rationalizing effects of truck traffic. Moreover, it impeded the 
development of logistics as a growing segment in the early phase of a service-oriented 
society: truck traffic decreased the costs and speeded up the transport of goods. In Germany, 
this aspect was not even considered in the research of economic effects of the motorway 
until 1970.3  
In contrast to Germany, in Italy the aspect of rationalization of the goods traffic was one 
reason for the construction of motorways, and was appreciated as transport 
“modernization” since the railroad showed very poor performance (Bonino and Moraglio 
2006). Capital investment in railway modernization focused on the area of passenger 
transportation, so that rolling material in freight haulage was no longer current. Moreover, 
the railway could not be integrated into a modern logistical concept of time-based 
competition, since the freight train did not run on schedule (Kerwer 2001, p. 173-216). In 
England, the construction of highways began with detour roads around the cities of Preston 
and Lancashire so that the cross-roads were cleared and goods traffic was accelerated. 
Charlesworth (1984, p. 35) shows the lobby work of the Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce.  
The development of truck traffic along the European motorway network is closely related 
to the evolution of modern logistical systems. Those evolved in the two main areas of the 
consumer-oriented economy: in the just-in-time delivery concept for automobile assembly 
facilities and in the build-up of modern distribution structures in the retail trade for the 
turn-over of goods in the already developed consumer goods industry. The stores were 
supplied by hierarchical distribution systems that were composed of central and regional 
warehouses where the goods were stored. The warehouses together with the motorway 
developed to the essential infrastructure of the mass consumption society. For example, 
consider the motorway M1 in the UK linking London to Leeds. Its section from Milton 
Keynes (location of the warehouse of Amazon) to Nottingham developed to the preferred 
location for distribution logistics known as “golden triangle”.4 
If one includes the automobile industry into the branch of the consumer goods industry, one 
can assert the thesis that the consumer-oriented economy is based on modern logistics and 
                                                                 
3 See literature report by Frerich 1974. 
4 Merriman 2007, p. 203. 
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vice versa. A consumer-oriented economy is characterized by a differentiated offer of mass 
customized goods in a consumer market where customers have a large choice of offers. The 
deliveries of goods are urgent. A rapid change of fashion and models on the consumer 
goods markets and time-based deliveries to the automobile assembly facilities require 
transports without delay. In European transport networks, this is only possible via truck, as 
door-to-door-transports without transfer, while the railway slackens in this system of time 
and quality competition.  
The question concerning the development of distribution systems was put in context with 
the distribution of consumer goods, and was related to the expansion of department stores 
and the increasing presence of chain branches within the retail sector. For the first time, 
scientific marketing methods were implemented systematically in retail. Customer desires 
were to be scrutinized and, if necessary, sparked. Additionally, agile logistics had to deliver 
the goods to the store racks in time, in order to avoid empty racks which might cause 
antagonism and loss of customers, which is very easy on a consumer market that appears to 
have an almost unlimited offer of goods. This reveals a consumer orientation in modern 
logistics. In the academic theory of logistics, the location of production plants, as well as 
central and regional warehouses, was researched in order to minimize storage and transport 
costs and transport to the stores (ReVelle and Swain 1970). 
The Western European the consumer-oriented economic system had a logistic structure that 
the following figure exhibits.5 With the exception of secured public or quasi-public sectors, 
the market economy regulated competition among producers of goods and service 
providers. The infrastructure of transport and storage capacity allows the supply of the 
goods required for production and the distribution of consumer goods. The consumer goods 
industry and especially the automobile industry were very well-developed. The logistics of 
the developed consumer goods markets could profit from a dense motorway network, to 
built-up structures of external suppliers in the automobile industry. The productive, truck-
based distribution structures served the supply of a large variety of consumer goods. The 
railroad transported primarily goods for the heavy industries. 
In addition, these infrastructure services lead to the structure of an economy based on the 
division of labor, which can exploit the learning curves and economies of scale provided by 
specialization. 
4. The automotive logistics of the automobile industry 
This section deals with the Europeanization of the automobile industry. It focuses on how 
the “automotive logistics” sector emerged. Growth and high earnings during the years of 
the economic miracle enabled the well-unionized work force of the automobile industry to 
implement high company tariffs. Management balanced high costs and affordable end 
products. The outsourcing of production and logistics into sectors and countries with lower 
wages served as a way out of the cost trap. In 1988, the average hourly wage amounted to 18 
                                                                 
5 For the structure of communist logistics see Vahrenkamp 2012. 
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euros for industrial workers in Germany, compared to Portugal where the hourly rate 
amounted to 3 euros (Eurostat 1989, p. 126). The transfer of warehouse operations and 
production supply processes to low-wage employees of the logistics trade lowered costs. 
This was the starting point for the development of just-in-time-delivery and the outsourcing 
of parts production to low-wage countries in the 1980s (Christopher 2010). Both 
developments gave a strong boost to the logistics industry to create a “modern logistics”, 
which extended the basic functions transport and storage with the aspect of quality: 
rapidity, punctuality, low error rates and process control with the help of computer 
networks were in demand. In logistics trade, the separate business segment “automotive 
logistics” was created, which complemented the classical logistic functions with services and 
production steps, such as inventory management and re-ordering, packaging, pricing and 
pre-assembly.  
 
Figure 1. Model of the logistic structure of the consumer-oriented economic system. 
5. Common traffic policy in Europe and the liberalization of truck traffic 
Border-crossing road freight transport in Europe was only made possible via a number of 
international institutions and agreements.6 The Economic Commission Europe (ECE), which 
organized the commission for domestic traffic, needs to be mentioned. Already prior to 
1949, this commission had been enabling truck traffic. This was thanks to its convention on 
road traffic (also called “Freedom of Road”). Foreign trucks obtained the right to enter a 
                                                                 
6 Regarding the following see Bundesminister für Verkehr 1961, part VII., Trinkhaus 1998, letter J., Frerich and Müller 
2004. 
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country with their freight, whereas before the convention, the cargo had to be shifted to a 
domestic truck at the border (Schipper 2007). The commission for domestic traffic 
coordinated the Marshall Plan’s aid supply which started in 1948. It also represented a field 
of policy for road and truck traffic expansion in order to compensate the railroad capacity 
constraint which followed the war. On May 19, 1956, the commission established the 
transport contract within the international road haulage (CMR), and the customs agreement 
on the international goods transport in sealed trucks with carnets TIR on 15 January, 1959. 
Therefore, custom checks for border-crossing transit transports became redundant. After all, 
the European conference of traffic ministers (CEMT), which was founded in Brussels in 1953 
by Italy, Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland, helped tremendously in coordinating 
traffic policy in Europe.7 It had the political goal of facilitating and easing the exchange of 
goods within Europe, and in 1960 it concluded an agreement at The Haag with respect to 
maximum size and weight of trucks. 
Beside oversight of the European Economic Commission, there were bilateral agreements 
between two countries regarding the amount of truck allocations. These were determined 
annually by representatives of the Ministries of Transport. If the contingents were spent, 
there could be no further truck traffic. This shows how restrictive and inflexible traffic 
allocation system was, especially with regard to the constantly growing exchange of goods 
within the European Economic Community EEC. 
The agreement for the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 aimed at 
developing a joint traffic policy to ease transnational goods traffic and to abolish barriers 
confronting the exchange of goods. The EEC agreement, under Title IV (“The traffic”), 
articles 70 to 84, required the coordination of European traffic policies. Conditions were to 
be formulated, under which traffic companies throughout the EEC were able to work. In 
particular, article 79 inhibits the discrimination of transport conditions based solely on the 
country of origin or country of destination (Trinkaus 1998, letter J211).8 Article 81 of the EEC 
agreement provides for a reduction in border taxes and fees. Articles 85 and 90 require free 
and fair competition in the economy, including the traffic sector. This was specified with the 
claim for free market access, the restraint of state subsidies, cartel bans, and the prohibition 
of abuse of power. However, it has been a long and difficult, 34-year way leading to the goal 
of a European-wide market with free access for transnational truck transport service. 
What is most surprising about the EEC agreement is its clear market-based orientation, 
which differs tremendously from the economic and traffic policies of the individual member 
countries. At the peak of the Cold War, this orientation was to be understood more as an 
ideological differentiation to the Eastern bloc than a maxim for domestic policy. Moreover, it 
                                                                 
7 An important step for Western Germany to overcome the foreign-policy isolation. The report of the „European 
Conference of Traffic Ministers“ on 16 October , 1953 is published in the traffic paper 1954, p. 178-180. By now, all 
European states (except Serbia), including Russia, form part of the CEMT, also Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
8 An example fort the discrimination is the transport of 100 tons steel plate. The prices for transportation via railway 
for a distance of 253 kilometers from Duisburg to Bingen amounted to 610 DM in July 1954. However, the price for a 
comparably long, but transnational roadway of 252 kilometers from Liege to Duisburg accounted for 378 DM. See 
Bayliss 1965, p. 11.  
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needs to be emphasized that the regulations of the EEC and the European Union referred to 
transnational traffic. Separately, each individual country can regulate its domestic traffic.  
Traffic policy can draw on many instruments to regulate truck traffic.9 There are three 
categories of instruments: regulation of market access, price regulation and regulation of 
operation, while taxes for the operation of trucks, security standards for vehicles and 
drivers’ working condition are set. If control of market access is reduced to subjective 
entrepreneur qualifications and if pricing is not subject to state requirements, this is 
considered liberalization of truck road haulage. In contrast, the operative regulation of truck 
road haulage is understood as the legal regulation of truck operation.  
The common traffic policy of the EEC focused on truck traffic, which was easier to 
standardize than the area of railroads, since these were state monopolies. In order to 
implement the requirements of Title IV of the EEC agreement pertaining to truck traffic, the 
EEC council of ministers had two main fields of policy: the liberalization and the 
harmonization of the operative truck road haulage regulations. Liberalization guarantees 
market access for foreign entrepreneurs in the home country, and creates competition in the 
hitherto isolated national markets. In the 1960s, truck industry regulation in the EEC 
countries showed varying levels. The countries which used the railroad as an instrument for 
economic and social policy also combined regulation with a protection policy, restrictive 
licensing and price regulations. These countries include England, France, Belgium, and 
Germany. The Netherlands considered the transport sector as a regular economic sector 
without public obligations. Italy limited its railroad policy to a deficit settlement (Bayliss 
1965, p. 64). Harmonization alludes to the unification of national operative regulations. 
Differences distort competition and hinder the creation of a common traffic market. In the 
field of harmonization, the EEC launched a number of regulations (European Commission 
2001, part 3). 
For decades, the EEC’s council of ministers was unable to put the liberalization requirements 
of Title IV of the agreement into practice, since some of the member countries initially aimed at 
harmonizing the terms of competition within the EEC. Among the member countries, 
Germany and France were interested in railroad protection and used the broad harmonization 
policy to postpone liberalization. As a precondition, they combined liberalization with 
extensive harmonization. The Netherlands and England had already liberalized truck traffic at 
the end of the 1960s, and did not support railroad-friendly politics. Hence, a conflict between 
harmonization supporters and liberalization advocates developed10 (Frerich and Müller 2004, 
p. 128). According to 1983 estimates of the European commission, high railroad deficits 
influenced opinions on traffic policy in some member states and “initiated them to judge the 
politics towards other carriers mainly on the basis of their effect on the railroad”. The 
commission suggested investigating road haulage for “further possibilities, how the supply 
could be adjusted to the demand, which made the present system for capacity checks 
unnecessary at the very end.” (Europäische Kommission 1983, p. 6 and 12). 
                                                                 
9 The regulation appeared for the first time in the 1930s in all European countries, see Bayliss 1965. 
10In England the market access and the pricing were liberalized since the 1960s, see Laaser 1991, p. 192).  
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As the conflict between harmonization supporters and liberalization advocates in the 
Council of Ministers caused a blockade of traffic policy for years, the institutions of the EEC 
developed an unpredictable dynamic. On January 22, 1983, the European parliament filed 
suit against the Council of Ministers at the European Court of Justice for failure to act. On 
May 22, 1985, the European Court of Justice enunciated a judgment against the Council of 
Ministers for failure to act (Blonk 1985, p. 97). Between 1985 and 1986, the Council of 
Ministers made decisions for the liberalization of road haulage. The existing discrimination 
on the side of any third parties due to bilateral quotas of truck rides was abolished in 
January 1992 with the help of a progressive and noticeable increase in multilateral joint 
quotas. In 1990, the truck transport tariffs in transnational traffic, which were created to 
protect the railroad, were abolished and free market rates were enacted.  
Compared to harmonization, which was subject to veto rule, liberalization was easier to 
achieve due to majority rule in the Council of Ministers. As a consequence, liberalization 
was realized without harmonization. For the establishment of equal market conditions, the 
important adjustment of truck taxes was not achieved until the turn of the millennium. In 
1996, the tax burden for trucks without exhaustion gas cleaning in Europe ranged from 414 
DM in Finland to 5,286 DM in Austria.11  
As a result of liberalization, the truck fleet increased sharply to 15.7 million in the years 
between 1980 and 1990, and in 1998 reached just 20 million, whereas in the decade between 
1970 and 1980, the number of trucks rose only by 3 million to 10.6 million. From 1990 to 
1999, traffic performance in the EU climbed from 790 to 1,258 billion tons kilometer. This 
included 76% of traffic within distinct member states (Eurostat 2002a, p. 1 and Tronet 2002). 
Liberalization lowered transportation costs due to strong competition within individual 
countries. This enabled commercial freight haulage to secure its market share between 1985 
and 1995 against transport on own account (“private carriers”). in all EU countries except 
Italy and Portugal. 
6. The European Domestic Market as logistics promoter 
The establishment of the European Domestic Market on January 1, 1993, and the conversion 
of the EEC into the European Union (EU) involved the harmonization of fees, taxes, norms 
and regulations. Furthermore, it was characterized by the omission of border formalities for 
transnational freight haulage by truck. Until then, long delays at the borders were necessary 
for the compensation of various strict regulations in the member countries, which lead to 
long traffic jams for trucks.12 The detailed investigations of the Cecchini Commission 
revealed that trucking companies suffered a loss of € 8 billion due to internal administrative 
costs and delays at the borders. This corresponded to approximately 2% of transnational 
goods value (Cecchini 1988). The waiting period reflected the processing of required 
                                                                 
11 Data according to the Federation of German Long-Distance Hauliers. One US-Dollar equaled about 2.50 DM in the 
1980s. 
12 In 1986, at the motorway border crossing Kiefersfelden from Germany to Austria, the Federal Government 
considered a truck’s hold of 1,200 meter length as necessary, see Bundestagsdrucksache 10/5908, p. 2. 
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documents at the border. These documents were related to different sales taxes and excise 
taxes, as well as varied sanitary and veterinary regulations for consumables. Moreover, 
different technical norms fragmented the market and impeded free goods traffic. Since 1993, 
those barriers with the exchange of goods and services no longer apply, and trucks can cross 
the borders without stopping.  
The establishment of the European Domestic Market involved the liberalization of truck 
transport and lent strong support to the restructuring of a Europe-wide logistics and to the 
intensification of European division of labor. Industry locations and supplier plants could be 
dislocated because of powerful logistics. While until 1993, distribution systems of producers 
or trading firms were organized as national entities in Europe, the EU then enabled 
transition to a transnational form of organization with centers of distribution that were able 
to supply entire regions internationally. This can be best seen in the metropolitan areas of 
London, Paris, Brussels and Cologne. There are in total approximately 80 million consumers 
represented – while the regions around Paris, Brussels, and Cologne is also called “blue 
banana” in transport geography. A central warehouse in Brussels or Lille can supply 
consumers in less than 24 hours with a truck-based supply network, making these locations 
very attractive for logistics in Europe. Since the opening of the Channel Tunnel 
(“Eurotunnel”) in 1994 (Gourvish 2006), the former mining town of Lille, is located in the 
center of the metropolitan areas. The connection Calais–Folkstone is built up with a 
commuter rail which transports trucks piggy-back through the tunnel. The train ride from 
Lille through the Eurotunnel to London takes 90 minutes, to Paris 60 minutes, and to 
Brussels 30 minutes. The rides via truck are comparable. In 1998, the commuter rail 
transported 704,000 trucks (Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 6 February 1999).  
7. Parcel services as pacemaker for the logistics industry  
The evolution from the industrial to the consumer-oriented society has increased the 
importance of valuable manufactured goods compared to bulk goods, and was noticeable in 
the 1970s due to the increasing volume of sent parcels throughout Europe. During 
liberalization of transport markets in the US in the 1970s and 1980s, the parcel services UPS 
and Federal Express were founded, which pretty soon focused on a global operating area. 
The parcel services have created the package with a limited weight and limited 
measurements as a special segment of the transportation business. They built a network of 
cargo airplanes for long-distance transport, which was independent of the freight capacity 
of passenger airplanes (belly freight) (Campbell 2001). 
The parcel services were promoters and pacemakers of the whole logistics industry and, 
with various innovations, they have paved the way to high performance logistics. They have 
defined the basic parcel and introduced the objective of standardization to the transport 
industry. They have tightened transport, achieving domestic delivery within 24 hours, while 
traditional packaged goods networks show a delivery time of three days. They have 
implemented measures to guarantee the quality of service. They were one of the first 
industries to use barcodes, enabling the tracking and documentation of parcels within the 
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system. In marketing, they introduced simple pricing models so that the customer could 
calculate the transport costs in advance. The complicated pricing models from the era of 
railroad logistics have been overcome.  
Up to 2000, parcel services showed high growth rates. They acted as competitors in the 
packaged goods sector and made much cargo shift to the parcel segment.  
8. Globalization boosting logistics 
The process of globalization led to the creation of production sites for consumer goods outside 
of Europe. Due to high wages and more liberal import policies, the consumer goods industry 
shifted their locations to the periphery of Western Europe, North Africa and Turkey as well as 
to Asia, in the 1980s and 1990s. The production of consumer electronics disappeared 
completely from Western Europe. At the same time, transport costs decreased drastically due 
to the containerization of world trade. Trading houses now procured a large portion of their 
goods in Asia.13 As a result, the logistics of consumer goods distribution were realigned to 
import harbors, where consumer goods arrived pooled in shipping containers and container 
handling replaced the labor-intensive handling of cargo on the quay. 
In the expansion of their terminal facilities, the ports could hardly keep up with the 
rapidly growing number of incoming containers. The German coffee-roasting company 
Eduscho (acquired in 1997 by Tchibo) that sold cheap consumer goods in their outlets 
pointed at the link between the import of consumer goods and container logistics. In 1993 
it built a central warehouse for containers in the port Bremen and supplied from there its 
22,000 outlets in Europe every week with new consumer goods.14 To meet the growing 
container traffic, London shifted its inner city harbor to the Thames estuary, while 
Hamburg's tried to defend its logistically unfavorable situation on the Elbe 100 km inland 
with ever new deepenings of the Elbe, in order to adapt the river to the rapid growth in 
size of container ships. From 1980, container ships that transported more than 3,000 TEUs 
were afloat.15 Ship beams were initially limited to 32.20 m because otherwise they would 
no longer fit through the Panama Canal, the link between the Atlantic and Pacific in 
Central America. Hence load capacities were limited to about 5,000 TEUs. However, the 
ships continued to grow despite the restrictions imposed by the Panama Canal. From 
1988, yards starting building ships with over 5,000 TEU which served Europe-Asia and 
North America-Asia routes. In 2000, the largest ship of the Maersk shipping line, the 
"Sovereign Maersk", had a cargo capacity of 6,600 TEUs. Just nine years later, shipping 
companies were putting vessels into service with a loading capacity of 13,000 TEUs.16 The 
growth in size lowered the transportation cost per container, but required large 
                                                                 
13 Levinson, Marc The Box – How the Shipping Container made the world smaller and the world economy bigger, 
Princeton/Oxford, 2006. Klose 2009. Taylor, D. European Distribution Strategy of Woolworth, in: Taylor, D. Global 
Cases in Logistics and Supply Chain Management, London 1997, p. 29-37. 
14 Deutsche Verkehrszeitung  8 Juni 1993. 
15 TEU is the conversion of container sizes to a 20-foot standard container (TEU = Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit). 
16 Rudolph 2009, p. 26. 
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investments in ports to enable container handling to keep up with ship sizes. While 
shipping companies raked in fantastic profits, the state had to provide the necessary 
infrastructure with billions in investments. This unsatisfactory situation could only be 
changed with a pan-European container handling tax. 
Globalization required special import logistics at Western Europe ports and distribution 
logistics linked with them via hinterland railroad transport. The northern ports of 
Rotterdam and Hamburg rose to become the major import harbors for containers in Europe, 
outdistancing ports on the Mediterranean, and achieved the position of container hubs 
which with feeder vessels supplied neighboring regions such as the countries on the Baltic 
Sea. In Hamburg, the growth in container throughput reached in the years 1995 to 2005 the 
considerable value of an average of 13 percent per year.17 Transport policies had not 
foreseen the container flood and had not made any provisions. Hinterland transport lines 
developed into bottlenecks of the supply chain. 
Until mid-1990s, the ports on the Mediterranean failed to invest in container handling and 
scared off customers with high fees, rigid working hours, threats of strikes and the risk of 
theft.18 Container ships with consumer goods from Asia reached the Mediterranean Sea by 
crossing the Suez Canal, but unloaded only a small part of their containers for Germany or 
Austria in Trieste, Genoa or Marseille, but sailed instead two additional weeks around the 
Spanish peninsula to unload them in northern ports.19 The company Kombiverkehr 
responded to this development by offering from 1995 trains from Hamburg and Bremen to 
Austria for the supply of consumer goods to Austria.20 This resulted in the significant CO2 
footprint of a 1000 km long railroad hinterland route from Hamburg to Vienna. In 1999, 66 
percent of import containers destined for Austria went through northern ports and only 34 
percent via Koper and Trieste.21 
9. Conclusion: The logistic revolution 
In the 1990s, the co-occurrence of various developments caused the logistic revolution: 
1. The deregulation of truck haulage markets, air traffic markets, telecommunication markets 
and mailing markets coincided in the 1990s and strongly affected the private supply of 
logistics services in the transport industry, parcel services, and telecommunication services, 
all of which were responsible for the management of logistic networks. 
2. The consumer-oriented economy has caused an increased variety of models in materials 
management, and has heightened the complexity of logistical processes in production 
                                                                 
17 Winter and Katzschner 2006, p. 1165. 
18 While in Hamburg in 2005 container throughput increased by 15 percent, in France it fell by 1.6 percent because of 
strikes in Le Havre and Marseille, Verkehrsrundschau 14 March 2006. 
19 The Mediterranean ports developed into bottlenecks of container logistics with correspondingly high wages of dock 
workers, which in Piraeus reached the fantastic value of 100,000 € per year, roughly the level reached by container 
ports along the U.S. west coast. 
20 Vierzig Jahre Kombiverkehr, published by the Gesellschaft Kombiverkehr, 2008.  
21 Lecture by Professor Sebastian Kummer on the Bremen Logistics Day, 30 March 2011. Tomsic 2004. 
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and trade. Haulers as logistics service providers have been integrated into production 
processes.  
3. Political developments have lead to a strategic realignment of distribution systems. 
Both the European domestic market, the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and the 
establishment of a market-based national economy required a new evaluation of 
previous logistical concepts in purchasing and sales. In this context, we can also speak 
of “Euro-Logistics”. 
4. The concentration in food retail has grown considerably within the past years. Retail 
companies have built up their own specialized logistics systems.  
5. Internet-based information systems, created in the 1990s, have drastically simplified 
and cheapened the exchange of information. They have contributed to the acceleration 
and precise management of material flows in the logistics supply chain. Internet-based 
mail order businesses have strengthened parcel services.   
6. The reliability and affordability of transport processes, which accompanied the logistics 
revolution, has increased the division of labor between the various production stages, 
leading to a displacement of production sites and to their integration into supply 
chains. This influence of modern logistics concepts on national economies is 
summarized by the term “logistics effect”. 
The logistics revolution has been complemented theoretically by the concept of Supply 
Chain Management created in the 1990s, which takes the entire and probably global 
supply chain into account instead of optimizing an economic function just locally. With 
this approach, the logistic revolution has found its theoretical conclusion (Christopher 
2010). 
The development of logistics was up to the year 2008 a classical success story. There seemed 
to be no barriers against continuos expansion. But, many traffic experts saw the rise of truck 
traffic within Europe critical, taking the environmental costs of truck transport into account. 
At the same time the European Union took measures to clean the exhaustion gases of trucks 
(now EURO 5 norm). In the European Community a long debate arose, how to identify and 
to charge these costs as part of the motorway toll. But before the year 2000, in Germany one 
could drive a truck on a motorway without any toll. Also car drivers and the public 
regarded trucks as troublemakers and exerted pressure on politics to restrain trucking. The 
consumers demanded on the one hand a broad selection in the shops, but did not recognize, 
that this service was almost impossible without truck delivery – at least when the railroad 
did not provide service of high quality. Austria and Switzerland imposed many restrictions 
on Alps crossing truck traffic. The issue of “green logistics” with a broad bundle of goals to 
reduce the environmental impact of logistics entered the scene of traffic policy not until the 
year 2000. 
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